Many historians claim that the principal motives behind the US’s participation in the 1953 Iranian Coup, commonly referred to as Operation Ajax, came from the US’s mid-20th-century anti-Communist agenda. While it is true that the justification for the US’s involvement stemmed from aggressive ideological foreign policy, this synopsis does not paint the entire picture. Throughout his time in control, the overthrown Prime Minister Mohammad Mossaddegh was careful to avoid Communist influence, and long before the coup, the US had had both a political presence in Iran and a strong opposition to Communism. Together, these facts suggest that it was not just the US’s anti-Communist foreign policy and agenda that brought Operation Ajax to life in August of 1953. Rather, using recent declassifications, this paper establishes how, instead of acting as a single cohesive actor motivated solely by a single rationale, the United States’ foreign policy and presence in Iran was composed of multiple uncoordinated entities, and that it was only when these independent and changing agendas and shifts in power aligned in 1953 that Operation Ajax was able to come to fruition. By unpacking the plurality of actors, competing interests, and contingent circumstances that shaped US decisions, this study underscores the need to move beyond simplified narratives of Cold War interventions. The 1953 coup emerged not from a single logic but from the convergence of competing agendas, shifting powers, and complex bureaucratic dynamics, offering a more nuanced view of US foreign policy.