The hard luck objection to free will suggests that if our actions are ultimately determined by factors beyond our control – what could be termed “no-control luck” – then free will is impossible. This objection rests on the premise that free will requires genuine control over our actions. This essay opposes this view, asserting that it conflicts with our intuitive understanding of free will. By comparing humans and large language models (LLMs), the paper demonstrates that while both are influenced by no-control luck, we intuitively ascribe free will to humans but not to LLMs. This difference in ascriptions suggests that the concept of free will, as commonly understood, does not depend on the presence or absence of no-control luck. Based on an analysis of contemporary positions in the free will debate, the essay concludes that our ascriptions of free will depend on factors other than no-control luck, and the hard luck objection fails to capture the essence of the concept of free will. The hard luck objection, therefore, fails to capture the true essence of free will. This analysis opens up a new possibility in the free will debate, suggesting that the traditional “up-to-us” condition may not be significant to the ascription of free will. Thus, it suggests the establishment of a potential new free will framework that requires further research. The discussions presented in this paper are intended to enrich academic discourse by challenging established paradigms and promoting a reevaluation of the foundational principles that underpin the concept of free will.